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Abstract
Due to compliance and IT security requirements, company-wide identity and access management within
organizations has gained significant importance in research and practice over the last years. Companies aim at
standardizing user management policies in order to reduce administrative overhead and strengthen IT security. These
policies provide the foundation for every identity and access management system no matter if poured into IT systems
or only located within responsible identity and access management (IAM) engineers’ mind. Despite its relevance,
hardly any supportive means for the automated detection and refinement as well as management of policies are
available. As a result, policies outdate over time, leading to security vulnerabilities and inefficiencies. Existing research
mainly focuses on policy detection and enforcement without providing the required guidance for policy
management nor necessary instruments to enable policy adaptibility for today’s dynamic IAM. This paper closes the
existing gap by proposing a dynamic policy management process which structures the activities required for policy
management in identity and access management environments. In contrast to current approaches, it utilizes the
consideration of contextual user management data and key performance indicators for policy detection and
refinement and offers result visualization techniques that foster human understanding. In order to underline its
applicability, this paper provides an evaluation based on real-life data from a large industrial company.
Keywords: Identity management, Policy management, Policy mining, Access control, Security management
1 Introduction
The efficient administration of employees’ access to
sensitive applications and data is one of the biggest
security challenges for today’s organizations [1]. Typi-
cally, large organizations manage millions of user access
privileges across thousands of IT resources. Due to
ineffective and application-specific user management,
employees accumulate excessive access rights over time.
As a consequence, most users are overprivileged, mean-
ing they are assigned more permissions than necessary
to perform their work. At the same time, organiza-
tional guidelines and policies can hardly be enforced in
a decentralized environment. As a result, organizations
implement a company-wide identity and access manage-
ment (IAM) system for the centralized management of
digital identities [2]. This enables organizations to imple-
ment standardized user lifecycle processes, reduce secu-
rity vulnerabilities and comply with existing national and
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international regulations like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [3]
or Basel III [4].
In general, typical IAM systems are built on three pil-
lars: processes, technologies and policies [5]. Core identity
lifecycle processes like user (de)provisioning or access
privilege management are implemented using available
automation technologies. Existing products offer a vari-
ety of functionalities like identity directories for data
storage, provisioning engines for user management or
workflow capabilities. Both processes and technologies
are controlled by a set of company-specific policies. These
policies control technological aspects like data synchro-
nization or data storage. At the same time, they are
responsible for process-related aspects like access priv-
ilege management, provisioning processes, and security
management within the IAM.
While available systems offer a variety of technologies
and functionalities for implementing user management
processes, policies have received little attention among
researchers and practitioners so far. Policy management
commonly still needs to be carried out manually by
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IT administrators with hardly any means for structured
policy definition or ongoing policy management being
available. Moreover, only static data is employed (e.g.
department of an employee), letting valuable data lie fal-
low. As a result, only a small number of basic policies
are defined and implemented in practice. These policies
are commonly extracted from partly documented inter-
nal regulations and requirements and remain unchanged
during system operation. This results in a situation where
policies outdate over time, leading to security vulnerabil-
ities, essentially reducing the advantages of a centralized
user management. Consecutively, it is mandatory that
policies evolve over time in order to reflect organizational
and technological changes within a company.
In order to overcome the existing limitations, this
paper introduces the dynamic policy management pro-
cess (DPMP) for IAM. It provides a structured approach
for policy management for IAM by applying automation
technologies. On the one hand, these techniques are used
in order to create a better knowledge about identity data
by calculating key performance indicators (KPI) to auto-
matically adjust policies to the current system state. On
the other hand, we use them to detect new and potentially
relevant policies as well as outdated policies. In contrast
to existing approaches, our approach integrates the anal-
ysis of user management data as well as contextual data.
The process model has been designed based on previous
academic work as well as on experience gathered during
our participation in several industry projects. In order to
underline its applicability, we extended an existing IAM
tool proposed in [6] with DPMP functionality. The tool
itself provides standard IAM connectors for widely used
application systems. This allowed us to facilitate avail-
able functionality and further evaluate the DPMP within
a real-life use case of a large industrial company (see
Section 5).
Our research methodology follows the paradigm of
design science research as presented by [7] and [8]. Fol-
lowing the design science cycle, we derive awareness for
the problem (step 1 of the design science cycle) in Section
1. In order to overcome the problems, we propose its cur-
rent state of research (Section 2) together with objectives
of our approach in Section 3 (2). We designed our artifact,
the DPMP, in Section 4 (3). The evaluation (4) and demon-
stration (5) following a real-world ex-post evaluation is
presented in Section 5. The adequate communication
started at ARES 2015 and is further continued with this
extended article in the EURASIP journal (6).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, an overview of related work is presented,
and Section 3 gives a conceptual overview of current
IAM systems and introduces our proposed improvement.
Section 4 introduces the DPMP, while the use case based
on real-world data from a large industrial company is
presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides a summary and
outlook for future work.
2 Related work
A large amount of research considering technological
components of IAM systems and their implementation
(e.g. [5, 9]), as well as their underlying access control
models has been carried out [10]. However, while the
importance of IAM policies in general [5] and of organiza-
tional policies in particular [11] has been acknowledged,
hardly any work specifically considers the challenge of
policy detection and management in large and complex
environments.
In the field of policy management, researchers have
proposed a variety of top-down and bottom-up policy
detection approaches. Examples for discovering security
policies top-down by extracting information for policy
definition from existing business processes are [12–14].
Wolter et al. [12], for instance, use business process mod-
els to formulate a set of security policies using the eXten-
sible Access Control Markup Language. Similarly, [13]
convert results from business process execution language-
based processes into an role-based access control (RBAC)
state [15]. Bhatti [16] specifically focus on the detection
of security policies, such as separation of duty (SOD)
policies. However, SOD policies only represent a small
portion of the policies required in IAM systems. Bailey
et al. [17] introduce a self-adaptive framework that mon-
itors authorizations made by role- or attribute-based sys-
tems, analyzes user behavior and adapts the target systems
accordingly. However, like other approaches, they focus
on the detection of security policies rather than providing
a guided process for comprehensive policy management
in company-wide user management.
Besides the top-down approaches, several researchers
have proposed bottom-up policy mining techniques
[18–20]. In [20], for instance, security policies are derived
from firewall and network information. Besides gen-
eral policy mining approaches, the research community
recently focused onmining attribute policies for attribute-
based access control [21, 22] in order to ease themigration
from traditional access control models such as RBAC
[18, 23]. While being valuable as a technological solution,
these approaches do not, among others, consider business
semantics or context information required in the context
of IAM to validate the correctness of suggested policies.
Additionally, these approaches focus on policy mining
based on static input data. Yet, within the context of IAM,
we aim to establish policy mining which uses dynamic
input and thereby reduces the need for permanent pol-
icy adjustment. Due to the amount and heterogeneity of
identity data, key indicators are necessary to abstract from
the overall complexity and generate information about the
current quality and state of the underlying IAM system.
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While mining technologies are capable of finding any
information within a certain set of data, this may lead
to unusable output due to the improper input (“garbage
in, garbage out”). By using KPIs, it is possible extract
understandable and processable data out of static iden-
tity information and thus support adaptability of policies
without having to change the policy itself. To our best
knowledge, this part is missing in IAM policy manage-
ment although it creates significant business value. Until
now, IAM research mainly focus on key performance
indicators for business decision support systems [24, 25].
These approaches evaluate the strategic and economic
value of IAM within an enterprise and thereby compare
potential benefits (e.g. reduced administration efforts or
security benefits) to emerging efforts (implementation
costs or operational risks). Further research aims at mea-
suring the performance of IAM processes [26] regarding
their maturity level or quality and coverage of processes.
Summing up, available bottom-up and top-down
approaches mainly focus on policy detection and
do not provide the structured guidance organizations
requirements: (1) to implement policy discovery and rec-
ommendation mechanisms and (2) ongoing policy main-
tenance in IAM environments. They do not consider
the integration of available context data or KPIs, decide
upon the value of certain information for policy detec-
tion, or show how to transfer detected policies into
daily operation. We argue that a comprehensive pro-
cess model is required for structuring policy manage-
ment in a company-wide IAM. Due to the complexity
of IAM systems, missing support for human decision-
makers reduces applicability in practical scenarios, essen-
tially limiting the benefit of centralized user management.
3 Conceptual overview
In the following, an overview of IAM systems and their
main components is provided. On this basis, we pro-
pose the extension of current IAM infrastructures using
a policy mining engine for improved policy detection
and recommendation. Section 4 consecutively introduces
the dynamic policy management process facilitating the
capabilities of the newly introduced policy mining engine
throughout its structured approach for policy handling.
3.1 Identity and access management components
Typical IAM systems consist of three fundamental com-
ponents (Fig. 1): IAM data stored in the infrastruc-
ture, tool-supported functionalities for executing and
Fig. 1 Basic architecture of identity and access management systems
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automating user management tasks and policies struc-
turing the management of the overall IAM system
itself [27].
3.1.1 IAM data
The required data within the IAM system is commonly
periodically loaded from connected applications. Those
can be enterprise applications having a dedicated user
administration (such as the Microsoft Active Directory
or SAP Enterprise-Resource-Planning (SAP ERP) sys-
tems). They, however, also can represent resources hosted
by partner companies (i.e. using identity federations) or
cloud-based resources. Table 1 gives a general overview
of existing and used data types. Typically, one or several
personnel data systems (HR system) provide employee
data such as an employee’s name, departmental assign-
ment and further attributes like his or her cost center
or location. At the same time, other applications provide
user account information such as account identifiers and
entitlement information like access privileges and related
attributes (e.g. owner or description).
The IAM data coming from the various sources is
linked and stored in a central database, creating new
data types for a global view on identities (e.g. combining
an employee’s master data with his or her application-
specific user accounts) and entitlements (such as business
roles that group access privileges from connected applica-
tions). Both the connector technology as well as the data
handling mechanisms rely on policies, e.g. for structuring
the frequency of data synchronization or data correlation
mechanisms.
3.1.2 Functionalities
IAM functionalities implement the logic required to oper-
ate the system and provide automated services. This
includes modules for user management, access man-
agement, data handling and synchronization, or user
provisioning [5, 9]. User management is concerned
with managing the identity lifecycle, whereas access
management provides functionality to authenticate and
authorize users. Data handling and synchronization
deal with integrating information from applications and
exchanging data in a consistent manner. Finally, user pro-
visioning is concerned with the allocation and revocation
of user accounts and access privileges or business roles.
All of these functionalities require the existence of policies
guiding their mode of operation.
The last column of Table 1 underlines that current IAM
systems commonly operate on the basis of information
on the subject (like employee data), the object (like access
privileges and applications) and the assignments between
both. Thus, they are only able to process a limited static
view without considering extended contextual informa-
tion like an employee’s activities within certain applica-
tions. In fact, most applications generate a huge amount
of (audit) data such as information about a requesting
entity, the affected resources, the location of access, the
time and the decision of whether the request was granted
or denied. Beside that, static information like assigned
permissions, information about the access model or the
history of an employee provides a relevant data source.
Based on this source, key performance indicators may be
computed e.g. for criticality or data quality which adapt
the system’s current state thus providing better policy
input. Additionally, data such as an employee’s contract
status stemming from an HR system might further sup-
port policy management. We argue that considering these
extended data types allows for the improved detection of
access management policies.
3.1.3 Policies
Policies are used in order to define the behavior of a (soft-
ware) system by using a dynamic parametrization [28].
Thus, both data and functionalities of IAM systems rely
on policies for guiding their mode of operation. Among
others, this has already been shown by [28] and [11], who
provide an overview of various policy types and their dis-
tinct sectors of applicability. Strembeck [28] introduces
three types of policies, namely authorization policies,
obligation policies and delegation policies. Similarly, [11]
Table 1 Data generated within current IAMS
System Data type Examples Used
HR system1..n
Employee master data Name, personnel number x
Employee context Login state of an employee regarding different applications, vacation, criticality of entitlements
Application1..n
Account information Account identifiers, account attributes (e.g. system accounts, privileged accounts) x
Entitlement information Entitlement identifiers, entitlement attributes (e.g. critical entitlements) x
Account activity Permission activations, activation sequences, type of permission usage, requested resources
IAMS
Identity information Accounts, corresponding systems, entitlements, roles x
Entitlement/role information Corresponding systems, attributes x
Provisioning information Requesting entities, affected resources, approving authorities, decisions x
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categorize policies into process policies, IAM policies and
security policies.
The focus of authorization policies is to manage access
to an object [28]. This type of policy regulates access to
resources within a company and aims at increasing the
security of company information and access to sensitive
resources. For example, a depiction of the rule that only
managers can view top-secret files falls into this category.
Delegation policies are a specific set of authorization poli-
cies that allow a subject to transfer the decision-making
tasks to other subjects.
Obligation policies can be divided into process policies
and IAM policies. IAM policies are responsible for the
design and governance of the functionality of an IAM sys-
tem, whereas process policies refer to rules that describe
how core business processes within organizations are exe-
cuted. Examples for IAM policies are the organization’s
guidelines on access privilege re-certifications or provi-
sioning policies that are used to automatically grant access
to a set of resources when new employees join the com-
pany. Process policies, on the contrary, describe which
permissions typically are activated together or sequen-
tially in order to execute complete process activities.
Within the context of IAM policy management, we sug-
gest a more application-oriented classification of policies
namely explicit and implicit policies. Explicit (what can
be defined as “precisely and clearly expressed or readily
observable”) polices are enforced by the underlying IAM
system. Consequently, they cannot be bypassed by users
and include a detailed definition (e.g. a script, code, rule).
By default, common IAM systems already provide a broad
range of implementable policies, yet these are mostly of
a technical nature (like synchronization modes concern-
ing connected applications or data storage). In order to
implement more specific policies, the system itself must
be customized or extended. As this is costly and requires
deep technical skills, those policies are hardly changed as
soon as they are implemented. Explicit policies can be cat-
egorized into security or authorization policies (actions a
user is allowed to execute) which are commonly imple-
mented in some form of access control matrix and process
policies (actions which involve further interaction if the
user is not directly authorized to achieve a desired result).
On the other hand, we introduce implicit (what can be
defined as “implied though not directly expressed”) poli-
cies which are not enforced by the IAM system itself
(e.g. due to lack of suitable technical means or dispropor-
tional implementation effort). Thus, they can initially be
expressed in various ways (e.g. a memo or within a dia-
log). Those implicit IAM policies are generally enforced
by a set of stringent decisions made by operators during
the lifetime of the IAM system.
Despite its importance, our experience from industry
projects shows that policy management and maintenance
are only rudimentary realized in practical scenarios. Poli-
cies implemented during the setup phase of an IAM
system outdate over time as no technological tools
or organizational guidance are available for verifying
them periodically or detecting newly required policies.
Defined policies are rather coarse-grained and simple.
The input attributes are generally static, what can partly
be attributed to the lack of available (contextual) data to
identify complex polices. Another reason is the human
IAM engineer’s lack of understanding of how and for what
applications are used by employees as well as the absence
of dynamically generated data in order to allow certain
policies to adapt to changes without having to change the
policy itself. Additionally, scripting languages are often
used to store policies. Hence, only a technically experi-
enced personnel is able to create and refine them due to
missing user interfaces.
3.2 Proposed policy management extension
In order to overcome the identified shortcomings, Fig. 2
depicts our proposed improvement. Firstly, we suggest the
facilitation of currently unused contextual data for policy
management. Secondly, we propose an approach to calcu-
late policy-relevant dynamic information based on static
identity data in order to improve adaptability. Thirdly,
we extend policy management capabilities of IAM sys-
tems with a policy mining engine that is able to consider
this contextual data during the automated detection and
refinement of policies according to a structured process
model (presented in Section 4).
3.2.1 Context data
According to Dey, “context is any information that can be
used to characterize the situation of an entity” [29]. In
today’s IAM systems, almost exclusively identity and enti-
tlement attributes are used as context data for policy deci-
sions. Following [30], we differentiate between five types
of additional context elements available in applications.
• Activity: Frequency and count of privilege activations
as well as the amount of application data accessed.
• Individuality: Attributes about employees, user
accounts, or access privileges data commonly
available within applications (e.g. department or
other attributes).
• Relations: Activity of similar or related employees,
whereas similarity can be based on employee
attributes or access privilege usage patterns.
• Location: The employee’s location from which an
activity originated. Technically, IP addresses (internal,
external, VPN) are often used in this respect.
• Time: The date and time when a permission
activation occurred, e.g. within common office hours
or at night.
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Fig. 2 Advanced architecture of identity and access management systems
3.2.2 IAM key performance indicators
The number of assignments managed by an IAM sys-
temmay significantly increase over years [2]. For instance,
during our evaluation (cf. Section 5.4), we analyzed an
SAP ERP system with more than one million assign-
ments of single roles to SAP user accounts, resulting in
more than 36 million objects for authorization (transac-
tions, activities, etc.). Even when such systems are care-
fully managed, it is hardly possible to have a detailed
knowledge about every user and all of his possibilities
to interact with the system based on assigned permis-
sions. This is only one example of the growing size and
complexity of modern IAM systems. While the raw data
itself already is hard to comprehend due to its volume,
the relations within such data are even harder to per-
ceive. However, we argue that integrating data from the
various context types explained in Section 3.2.1 can lead
to a better understanding concerning the occurrence of
security incidents. Due to the load of IAM data, such con-
nections between data types need to be established in an
automated way. Through detailed inspection of the inte-
grated data, so called IAM KPIs may be defined acting
as thresholds for normal behavior. Consider an exam-
ple where the chief financial officer of a company is
analyzing his company’s net value statistics. While it is
perfectly normal for him to regularly check this informa-
tion, such re-occurring usage patterns integrated with the
time and location of access can be good indicators for reg-
ular behavior. If such a predefined KPI reaches a value
tuple that is outside of its previously common boundaries,
either at runtime or ex-post, measures can be taken in
order to justify abnormal behavior. Another simple KPI
example are significant behavioral or entitlement changes
of an employee, where there might be several reasons.
Including events of the employee’s history into the KPI
may result in better observations about possible reasons
for the changes (e.g. switched department or position,
warnings) in order to generate high-quality security noti-
fications. Thus, automatically generated information out
of static data may provide an enhanced view on company
events and therefore enable better automated decisions.
3.2.3 Improved policymanagement
To extend the policy functionality of today’s IAM system,
we introduce a new policy mining engine which gathers,
processes and stores static and contextual data (as defined
in Section 3.1.1) in order to discover KPIs and existing but
not documented policies. Additionally, after monitoring
and validating employees’ activities for a sufficient period
of time, it is able to recommend the refinement of existing
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policies according to the previously defined KPIs. As an
example, access patterns of employees across applications
can be monitored and policies for resource access can
consecutively be refined based on actual usage statistics,
usage times or the criticality of access privileges.
4 Dynamic policy management process
To implement our research of an improved policy man-
agement in IAM systems in complex IAM environments,
a structured process model is mandatory in order to
ensure applicability. In the following section, we thus
introduce the dynamic policy management process sup-
porting organizations during their policy management
activities (see Fig. 3). It consists of four phases that struc-
ture the activities required for policy management.
At first, the infrastructural setup of the policy man-
agement component within the IAM system takes place
(phase 1). Input data sources are identified, and policy
mining mechanisms are parametrized accordingly. Con-
secutively, the collection of input data is carried out (phase
2). This comprises activities like data loading, data nor-
malization and data linking required as input data might
vary regarding its currency, accuracy or provided attribute
dimensions. During phase 3, the data correlation and pol-
icy mining takes place in order to differentiate between
normal and outlier behavior patterns hinting at potential
policy definitions and policy violations. Throughout the
last step (phase 4), the results are validated and presented
to human IAM engineers facilitating their organizational
expertise in order to model well-designed policies.
Note that phases 2–4 of the DPMP are commonly exe-
cuted in a cyclic manner while the first phase must be
reentered in case the system landscape changes or other
strategic changes require adjustment.
The main characteristics of the DPMP are:
• Minimizing efforts to define an initial set of policies.
• Improve the quality and adaptibility of input
parameters of policies.
• Providing tool support to enable human IAM
engineers to execute policy modelling and refinement.
• Integrating both actual authorization usage data and
business knowledge.
• Improving IT security through continuous
refinement of policies based on actual employee
behavior.
4.1 Infrastructure setup
Phase 1 of the DPMP is concerned with the overall pre-
configuration of the infrastructure, identifying and setting
up data sources, and configuring system behavior regard-
ing policy detection and policy recommendation.
4.1.1 Data identification and connection
Prior to the actual policy mining, available sources for
contextual data need to be identified. Typical data sources
are applications connected to the IAM system which
store contextual data in log files. Human experts (e.g.
the system administrators and IAM engineers) need to
decide which contextual information from a particular
application should be facilitated based on the expected
business value, e.g. the potential workload reduction for
user management by defining new authorization policies.
For the purpose of improving the provisioning processes,
for instance, the number of permission activations, the
time or location (e.g. in-house, through VPN, the originat-
ing country) for each application might be of relevance.
Note that this step heavily depends on the accessi-
bility of data and their potentially temporal availability.
While data from centralized applications like SAP ERP
systems might be easily accessible, contextual informa-
tion collection from distributed environments (like file
servers in a globally operating organization) might be
cumbersome. For our approach, not all data need to be
synchronized but only these within the scope of policy
detection.
After the identification of available contextual informa-
tion, the data connection settings need to be adjusted.
The goal is an automated data synchronization based
on existing connectors as well as additional application
connectors (e.g. in case required contextual information
stems from a system not yet connected to the IAM sys-
tem). Setting up the data synchronization also includes the
mapping of data from applications to the entities stored
in the IAM system. Contextual data such as user account
activity, for instance, needs to be related to the respective
user accounts and employees.
4.1.2 Policymining settings
After successful data selection and import, the respec-
tive data analysis configuration needs to take place. This
includes the weighting of input data for automated data
analysis and identification of attributes relevant for key
Fig. 3 Proposed policy optimization process model
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indicators, as well as settings regarding the system’s pol-
icy recommendation behavior. Regarding the input data
weighting, human IAM engineers could e.g. decide to give
more weight to data values that are constantly updated,
maintained and revised and thus have a high accuracy
during the consecutive algorithmic analysis.
In order to provide a better understanding and pro-
vide additional input parameters, the static access model
is evaluated concerning criticalities of assignments. This
is achieved using data mining techniques. Using a set
of defined parameters, the calculation may be calibrated
and reviewed by an human IAM engineer in order to
minimize false-positives and improve confidence about
the data.
Additionally, the methods of policy recommendation
can be parametrized according to a given organizational
scenario. Similar to approaches used for the cleansing of
static access privilege assignments, for example presented
in [31, 32], the DPMP requires human expert interac-
tion after the detection of potentially reasonable policies.
In case the system suggests an unreasonable large num-
ber of new policies potentially including a high rate of
false-positives (detected policy suggestions which are dis-
carded after human review), it would add an additional
burden rather than create value for an organization. As
a result, the system’s data mining techniques need to be
parametrized in order to only suggest policy definitions
for selected behavior patterns.
These settings commonly require the initial analysis
of input data over a reasonable period of time. Imagine
the correlation of access privileges usage with employ-
ees’ location data. In case the investigated privilege is
only used by employees from a specific location during
the period of investigation, the DPMP might recommend
the definition of a provisioning policy that only assigns
employees from this location to the according access priv-
ilege. If the period of investigation has been set too short,
employees from other locations might also request the
usage of this access privilege, essentially requiring the
adaption of the defined policy.
4.2 Data collection
After successful setup of the policy management system,
the data collection phase takes place. During this step,
the input data is loaded, normalized and linked according
to the previously defined settings. The goal is a periodic
and fully automated data loading process shifting from
a manual administration to an automatic machine-based
execution. As a result, the latest input data are avail-
able for the automated analysis at any point in time for
policy management without the need for further human
interaction.
In a first step, the raw data from the relevant applica-
tions is imported and normalized. Systems which create
a constant data stream require a continuous import, con-
version and storage of data while other applications might
only support a full data export (e.g. using the CSV file for-
mat). Furthermore, data storage types might vary among
applications, requiring data normalization. Examples are
an ERP application providing usage data aggregated per
single day and the amount of data accessed by clients
in megabytes while a file service application delivers a
steady stream of data and the amount of data sent to
clients in bytes. During a last data collection activity, rela-
tionships among data elements stemming from different
points of time are set up. For each employee, access priv-
ilege or business role, a change history is generated. This
e.g. allows for the detection of activity patterns fostering
the identification of user provisioning policies.
4.3 Data correlation and policy mining
During the data correlation phase, the automated policy
mining takes place. The goal is to generate recommen-
dations for relevant policies which have not been imple-
mented up to now. At the same time, already established
policies are validated for adjustment. In this paper, it is
not our goal to provide a comprehensive list of pattern
detection techniques but rather aim at showing that those
techniques can be applied to support policy management
efforts in general. For evaluation purposes, we imple-
mented a set of analysis techniques (see Section 5). These
techniques are designed as depicted in Fig. 4.
The DPMP facilitates existing data mining technologies
(e.g. clustering [33] or neural networks [34]) on the basis
of existing identity information, contextual data and the
various data dimensions defined during the initial setup
phase (see Fig. 4). Patterns of normal and outlier behavior
are automatically extracted for investigated subjects. The
subject may either be a single entity or a group of enti-
ties which can be uniquely identified by a set of attributes
within the context of a policy. Such an entity can be an
employee, a user account within an application or a role
bundling access privilege from different applications. Such
data are augmented by their contextual data generated, for
instance, when an entity is involved in any kind of activity.
Data mining allows for a multi-dimensional analysis
facilitating sets of relevant attributes of subjects (e.g.
employees, user accounts, or entitlements) and objects
(e.g. amount, frequency, or criticality of data accessed).
The overall goal is to identify clusters of subjects that
share contextual data patterns which might in turn lead to
the definition of IAM policies and the detection of outliers
violating the policy.
Imagine an organization that aims at ensuring the prin-
ciple of least privilege [35] in order to minimize insider
misuse by overprivileged employees. Employees only are
allowed to have the minimum set of access privileges
required by their daily work. The DPMP in this respect
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Fig. 4 Input and output of policy mining algorithms
continuously monitors existing user provisioning poli-
cies by identifying outdated access privilege assignments
based on users’ behavior. The example in Fig. 5 depicts
the analysis of a privilege providing access to billing data
within the company based on employee’s location (“New
York”) and department (“finance”). The current provi-
sioning policy might be refined after automated usage
pattern detection identified that only employees which
are assigned to the job function “clerk” actually use the
respective access privileges (independent of their assigned
location) while “secretaries” within the finance depart-
ment in New York do not activate the access privilege
at all.
Examples for the detection of anomalies (in contrast to
standard usage patterns) might include entitlements for
accessing financial data being activated from a VPN con-
nection (while an according policy forbids this access) or
access privileges which are used to manipulate an extraor-
dinary amount of data.
Our approach distinguishes between the three policy
types, namely security policies, process policies and IAM
policies.
Every mining process is divided into three steps,
namely “data construction”, “data analysis” and “con-
textual evaluation”, whereas the data analysis may go
hand in hand with the contextual evaluation. During the
first step, we create a suitable data structure based on
availability of data and selected and weighted dimen-
sions as well as additional information (e.g. KPIs). After
that, the analysis of the data takes place. The out-
come is further characterized by using available con-
textual data concerning involved entities. The presented
approaches do not aim to present novel algorithms for
the presented problems but to foster already estab-
lished techniques and adjust these based on the require-
ments of IAM systems and their policy management
components.
4.3.1 Security policy
Mining of security or authorization policies based on an
available static access control matrix has been within the
focus of research for some time (e.g. [18, 36]) especially
since standards like ABAC [37] are heavily dependent on
this construct, like this aim to extend these techniques
Fig. 5 Example of access privilege activation analysis
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by enhancing the input data and the characterizations of
output data using contextual information.
The first step is to analyze the existing access control
matrix based on semantic analysis techniques and usage
statistics. Semantic analysis [31, 32] introduce a classifi-
cation for every assignment based on the examination in
context of other entities within the given scope. A sim-
ple example would be if only one employee within the
“development” department owns the entitlement “access
marketing share”. As a result, this permission assignment
might probably be invalid and should be revoked. We use
these techniques to sort out potentially invalid assign-
ments which create noise during policy mining. Similarly,
we identify and exclude unused entitlements (with an
adjustable period of time) and recommend manual review
by human IAM engineers.
For the authorization policy mining, we facilitate avail-
able algorithms (like those proposed at [16, 18, 21]). These
algorithms operate on different types of data, e.g. log
files, roles or user permission assignments, and can be
adjusted according to the available access control model
and available data sources.
During the last step, we analyze every mined policy
according to its usage profiles. This includes attributes like
location, time, consumed CPU resources or the amount
of data read or written. These profiles are analyzed using
classification techniques (e.g. [33]) in order to reveal
normal and abnormal utilization behavior. Consider the
example of an entitlement to modify data within an appli-
cation. The amount of data typically modified during nor-
mal manual operation can be classified e.g. financial data
are usually not modified throughout activities creating
gigabytes of traffic. This enables human IAM engineers
to evaluate usage profiles of entitlements or authorization
policies according to compliant operation of applications.
4.3.2 Process policy
Process policies represent a subset of obligation policies.
They define constraints for actions within a process which
need be carried out in order to achieve a desired busi-
ness value of which a user is not directly authorized to.
Within context of IAM, for example, this could be the
obtaining of an approval to assign a specific access right
or a re-certification. In order to identify process policies,
we aim to identify events which trigger such processes as
well as necessary checkpoints or nodes (e.g. the head of
department’s approval) which need to be passed in order
to achieve a desired result.
For the transformation of activities into structured pro-
cesses, we use business process mining (BPM) techniques
(as proposed in [38]). For data construction, we use the
concept of trace clustering which divides activity logs into
traceable clusters or in other words single process itera-
tions. In the context of IAM, this could be a ticket number
or a process id in relation with a specific request type. This
information are subsequently mapped into a process rep-
resentation (e.g. BPMN) for further analysis. Information
about processes could theoretically be extracted directly
from a business process management system. Yet, the goal
is to create a detailed overview about the status quo within
the IAM system (independent of how the system should
actually be used) and possibly create a comparison to
already defined processes.
During the next step, we try to derive a detailed char-
acterization of every process node including decision-
making entities as well as the respective context of the
decision. We aim to identify similarities between the deci-
sions (e.g. every re-certification was done during business
hours from within the IT building by an employee within
the same department and attribute “head of department”)
as well as outliers (e.g. every approval of this entitlement
was done by an employee with the attribute “entitle-
ment owner” during business hours, while one approval
was done at 22:00 pm by an admin account). In order
to achieve this, we firstly have to generalize information
as far as available. For example regarding the time of
actions, we may distinct between business hours and clos-
ing time, location between off- and onsite, devices could
be separated into business owned devices, private devices
and hybrid usage. Using this compression, we are able to
reduce the number of possible definitions for each process
node. After that, we classify affected entities per pro-
cess step using different, individually weighted attribute
permutations as input.
During step three, we create an extended process defi-
nition. For every process step, the created classifications
are analyzed. If a classification which includes every entity
who finished the respective step is available, its attribute
combination is used as a possible definition for the step. If
no suitable cluster can be identified, all clusters are used
as possible definitions and thereby an extended manual
review is necessary.
4.3.3 Implicit IAM policies
As mentioned above, IAM policies are responsible for the
design and compliant operation of IAM systems. Yet by far
not every IAM policy is technically implemented. The IT
of today’s companies is forced to adapt business changes
and support the business in an optimal manner. Thus,
directly customizing the IAM system according to every
business change is hardly executed in practice because of
the resulting efforts. Due to these reasons, we do not aim
to exhaustively mine all possible IAM polices which are
currently in place and technically enforce them as it would
impose rigid restrictions to the system and potentially
have a negative impact on business processes. However,
we propose a mechanism which allows the system to
learn current IAM policies and create recommendations
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regarding system operation. Consider the example of an
international help desk who is in charge of processing
orders regarding the IAM system (e.g. the request for
assignment of an entitlement or access to a specific appli-
cation) with all requests requiring manual review. By
generating recommendations out of previous decisions,
approvers can be supported during the review process.
Our first step is to classify users of the system accord-
ing to their weighted attributes (e.g. [33]). This enables us
to derive an overview of which types of users are man-
aged by the system. If applicable, there may be several
different classifications if the company is structured in a
complex way. After that, we derive a set of actions (e.g.
requests, authentications) carried out by those types of
users. These partitioned user sets combined with affili-
ated contextual data and the history of activities allows
us to use a context-aware recommender system (e.g.
[39, 40]). Standard recommender systems in general aim
at providing suggestions for items which are considered
to be useful for a user [40], whereas context-aware rec-
ommender systems operate on tuples in the form of
< user, item, context, rating >. In the context of IAM,
users are the company’s employees and items represent
achievable resources (e.g. entitlements or files). As soon
as the calculated rating extends the defined threshold,
a positive recommendation is given, otherwise a nega-
tive one. As context-based frameworks for recommender
systems take attributes like activity, location, user infor-
mation and related resources into consideration [40], they
consequently meet the requirements of an IAM policy
recommendation system.
4.4 Policy validation and recommendation
After successful data correlation and policy mining, a set
of potentially relevant policies (e.g. provisioning policies
changing the current access control state) has been identi-
fied. As IAM systems and connected applications manage
a huge amount of data, a high number of potentially rele-
vant policies might be detected by each DPMP iteration.
These policy candidates need to be validated by the pol-
icy management system before being communicated in an
appropriate manner to human IAM engineers for refine-
ment. Policy validation thus can observe the underlying
rule for every detected policy over a certain period in time
before it is recommended to a human IAM engineer. In
case a policy suggestion is based on usage activity pat-
terns, for instance, these patterns can be validated over
a period of 1 month. In case the pattern changes during
the investigation period, the policy suggestion itself can be
revoked.
Policy mining is limited to generating a set of policy sug-
gestions based on classifications of subjects together with
their behavior based on contextual data and history. As a
result, the focus during the last phase of the DPMP lies
on the presentation of results in an intuitive and human-
understandable way in order to enable the IAM engineer
to easily derive appropriate actions. Visualizations can be
based on techniques like charts or data tables. From our
practical experience, it is essential to include the visu-
alization of the reasons why a certain policy suggestion
has been created. In case ambiguous or mutually exclu-
sive rules have been identified, this information has to be
included in the result presentation as well. A human IAM
engineer might, for instance, be informed that accept-
ing one policy suggestion might lead to the violation of
another already implemented policy. He then might be
able to decide whether the old policy is outdated while the
new policy suggestion should be activated.
Again, it is not the goal of this paper to provide a
comprehensive list of potential visualizations or rule defi-
nition scenarios but rather underline the importance of a
dedicated result refinement phase including human inter-
action as a cornerstone of ongoing policy management
in IAM.
In this section, we proposed the dynamic policy man-
agement process which enables organizations to gather a
deeper understanding of its IAM, the (contextual) data
and the quality of currently implemented policies as
well as potential policy suggestions. Based on company-
specific settings, the DPMP is able to import the necessary
input data, identify patterns of standard subject behav-
ior and support human IAM engineers during policy
definition and refinement.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the applicability of the DPMP
in a real-world scenario. The evaluation is based on data
stemming from the SAP ERP system and the IAM system
of a globally operating manufacturing company with more
than 12,000 internal and 4000 external employees. A total
number of 8021 active user accounts, 3925 single roles,
762 composite roles and 1,180,962 access privilege assign-
ments from the SAP ERP system were initially imported
and anonymized. For the following evaluation, the period
under observation comprised 5 weeks during which daily
re-imports took place.
Increasing audit requirements force the company to
improve IAM policy management. Up to now, only rudi-
mentary provisioning and access re-certification policies
have been defined due to missing tool support and knowl-
edge about the underlying data. As a result, a policy
detection project has been initiated. Its main goals are:
1. The consideration of contextual data and KPI
definition from the SAP ERP system for policy
generation
2. The semi-automated detection of new and
potentially relevant provisioning and re-certification
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policies as well as the identification of loosely defined
and hence insecure existing policies
3. Providing appropriate visualizations of detected
policies to support human IAM engineers
While requirement (1) corresponds to phase 1 and
2 of the DPMP, (2) relates to its data correlation and
policy mining phase (phase 3). Requirement (3) deals
with the presentation of discovered policies according to
phase 4 of the DPMP. Even though we executed numer-
ous policy detection activities, we focus on two spe-
cific examples for evaluation purposes in the remainder.
Firstly, the analysis of access privilege activations has
been compared to the static distribution generated by
the current provisioning policy in the IAM system (cor-
responding to phase 2 of the DPMP, see Section 5.3).
Secondly, detected access privilege activation frequen-
cies were visualized in relation to the amount of data
objects modified (i.e. data within the SAP ERP system)
for investigation by a human IAM engineer (correspond-
ing to phases 2 and 3 of the DPMP, see Sections 5.3
and 5.4).
Note that a comparative evaluation of our prototype-
based approach with manually executing policy detection
and recommendation cannot be executed. This is due to
the inapplicability of a manual examination of the several
hundred thousands of access privilege assignments and
the available large amount of contextual information.
5.1 Infrastructure setup
To address requirement (1), at first, context data available
in the SAP ERP system was analyzed (step 1 of phase 1).
Using the classification technique for context data from
Section 3.2.1, the following information on user behavior
was extracted and mapped: number and frequency of read
and write permission usage and amount of transferred
data (activity) for each account (individuality) per day
(time) and the corresponding IP address (location). Sub-
sequently, policy mining parametrization was conducted
(step 2 of phase 1). Initially, the set of prototypical imple-
mented algorithms (including data classification mecha-
nisms and statistical distribution analysis) were applied
using a default configuration. On this basis, distinctive
properties of the imported data set became apparent.
For instance, due to SAP ERP system limitations, user
behavior can only be extracted on a daily basis. Thus,
algorithms need to be configured to identify permission
usage irregularities per day (e.g. suspicious permission
activations on weekends) but not within the course of a
single day (such as off-time activities). Furthermore, data
types were weighted in cooperation with a human system
expert, emphasizing the importance of data types such as
IP address and employee status information during the
following analyis.
5.2 Data collection
After successful configuration and parametrization, the
data collection took place (phase 2 of the DPMP). We
implemented a software wizard to ease the import of
raw data types onto the internal data structures of the
extended IAM tool (see Fig. 6) in an automated manner.
The wizard shows an excerpt of available contextual data
which can be extracted from an SAP ERP system. Avail-
able contextual data from applications strongly vary (e.g.
contextual data for an active directory may be derived
from connected share systems). The wizard shows an
Fig. 6 Infrastructure setup wizard
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excerpt of the broad variety of contextual data which can
be extracted from applications and used for the policy
mining step. Additionally, data from the SAP ERP system
was mapped onto existing user management data from
the IAM system. SAP user account activities, for instance,
were related to the respective employees’ identities. As a
result, a total number of 6,214,422 records from 36 days
containing contextual information as well as user manage-
ment data from the SAP ERP system were gathered and
mapped using our daily data import functionality.
5.3 Data correlation and policy mining
During the third phase of DPMP the actual policy mining
was conducted in order to address project requirement
(2). Using our implemented policy mining algorithms, we
were able to detect standard usage patterns potentially
leading to the definition of new policies as well as the
refinement of currently implemented policies.
Concerning the first exemplary case, we computed the
distribution of static assignments of access privileges
among the top level departments of the company and
compared these to their actual activation information.
Table 2 shows the distribution of access privilege P1 across
top-level departments of the company and its actual acti-
vation in these departments. As can be seen, nearly half
of the employees that are assigned to P1 are working in
the department D3. The access privilege is almost exclu-
sively used (99.96 %) in this department, while only a small
number of activations (0.04 %) stems from department
D1. This indicates that access privilege P1 might only be
required for tasks conducted in department D3. Thus, a
refinement of the existing provisioning policy that addi-
tionally requires employees to work in department D3
in order to obtain this access privilege is recommended.
This restructuring might lead to a reduction of the num-
ber of overprivileged employees, thereby strengthening IT
security.
In summary, out of the company’s total 3925 single roles
defined in the SAP ERP system, we identified 382 (i.e.
9.7 %) which—though being assigned to employees in a
particular department—were hardly activated (activation
Table 2 Static distribution and actual use of access privilege P1
Department Distribution of static Activation frequency (%)
assignment (%)
D1 21.15 0.04
D2 24.39 0.00
D3 45.08 99.96
D4 4.82 0.00
D5 0.72 0.00
D6 1.54 0.00
D7 2.3 0.00
frequency for the respective department is below 1 %).
In an ongoing effort, these results are discussed with the
company’s IAM engineer in order to improve existing pro-
visioning policies and refine existing SAP role definitions
leading to access privilege revocation.
For our definition of KPIs, we intensively examined a
criticality value for every employee based on his cur-
rently assigned entitlements. An employee was defined
as critical as soon as he owned permissions which are
not common for his position within the enterprise. The
more uncommon an entitlement is (e.g. because he owns
multiple times as many permissions as other employees
within his departments), the higher the criticality value.
By calculating such value for each employee, the policies
that are addressing privileged employees can be rede-
fined. In discussions with the company, we agreed on
primarily taking the employee’s contextual data of per-
missions into account (in this case his department and
other employees provisioned with similar access rights).
For this effort, we used a set of parametrized anomaly
detection algorithms for outlier detection algorithms [41]
for the criticality determination of user permission assign-
ments. Our applied algorithms measure the distribution
of permission assignments among a defined set of users.
We use different sets of input parameters ranging from a
high to a low detection rate. The lower the detection rate,
the higher the criticality value of the assignment. A sim-
ple example for such an algorithm would be to detect all
entitlements assigned to not more than a certain percent-
age of employees. For each of our algorithms, we created
a set of parameters varying from a severe to a slack detec-
tion rate. According to the quantity of re-occurrences of
results throughout different parameter sets, we catego-
rized the assignments of the employees on a Likert scale.
This ranges from uncritical to very critical, thus providing
an easy to understand overview about the current access
model. Consider the following simplified example demon-
strating the functionality: an employee from the finance
department is switching positions within the company
and is now working for the marketing department. Due to
lack of correct revocation policies, the employee retains
some of his old permissions. In our approach, each of
these permission assignments would be detected by each
run of the algorithms with all of the previously calibrated
parameter sets. As even the strictest parameter set (i.e. the
set that tolerates least errors in the data) together with all
others flags this assignment as critical, its overall critical-
ity is set to very critical. The resulting distribution for the
assessment of all of the company’s assignments is depicted
in Table 3.
Fostering these results enables the system to automati-
cally classify each employee concerning his criticality. For
the employee categorization, we followed the maximum
principle according to the BSI Grundschutz [42] which
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Table 3 Criticality of assignments based on static analysis
Criticality Number of assignments Percentage (%)
Uncritical 1,087,939 92.12
Very low criticality 34,494 2.92
Low criticality 31,888 2.70
Critical 13,792 1.17
Very critical 12,851 1.09
states that the security level of an object should be as high
as the highest of its associated resources (in our case the
most critical user permission assignment):
Criticalityemployee = Max
(
criticalityUPA
)
.
The results of our criticality calculations are as follows.
The data depict a very even distribution of assignments
among the overall company having only 1.08 % assign-
ments with a high criticality level. Nevertheless, there are
12,851 assignments affected, which may impose severe
security risks upon the enterprise (according to our cal-
culation that we established in conformance with the
company). Concerned were a total number of 428 highly
critical user accounts. These data can now be used in
order to enhance affected policies for user management
e.g. by employing more frequent re-certifications ([43]) or
four-eye prinicples.
In order to address project requirement (3), we aimed
to derive usage patterns of permissions based on con-
textual data. As mentioned above, the system currently
manages over one million permission assignments (an
average of about 147 assignments per user) with more
than 30 million assignments possible. Therefore, we aim
to qualify permission assignments based on activities car-
ried out by users. Single roles usually conform with a
well-defined set of actions which they enable a user to
execute. Consequently, these actions generate a similar
fingerprint concerning usage profiles (e.g. data modified
or read) within a predefined period of time. We aim to
identify these fingerprints by applying our security pol-
icy mechanisms. The first step is to set up a suitable
data set for the analytics which consists of all user per-
mission assignments (UPA) and a set of contextual data
concerning permission activations aggregated per day (see
Fig. 6). We combined these data to a set of vectors in the
form of:
Vactivity = {UPA, datamodified, dataread}.
For these data, we created clusters using [44]. Accord-
ingly, we are able to classify the usage of every permis-
sion assignment on a daily level. As described above, we
computed a criticality value for all user permission assign-
ments. This enables us to combine classified usage profiles
(as depicted in 7) with the criticality value of each assign-
ment. As these results are not directly usable by human
IAM engineers, suitable visualization techniques have to
be applied.
5.4 Policy validation and recommendation
In order to further address project requirement (3), pre-
viously detected standard usage patterns need to be
validated and visualized for human refinement. Figure 7
depicts a screenshot from our extended IAM tool which
uses a bubble chart visualization in order to display
detected usage patterns. The x-axis corresponds to the
amount of data that has been “modified” by an employee’s
access privilege activations on a single day, while the y-
axis denotes the amount of data being “read”. During phase
1 of the DPMP, thresholds were defined for highlighting
power users, i.e. employees which either read or modify
large amounts of data within the SAP ERP system. In the
given example, an employee has been marked as a power
user (orange colored highlighting) if he either read more
than 10,000 MB or modified more than 200,000 data sets
Fig. 7 Detection of SAP power users (http://www.nexis-secure.com)
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per day. Bubbles in the lower left area of Fig. 7 corre-
spond to average system users, while highlighted bubbles
in the other areas correspond to power users. In the given
example, 63 power users were identified for the interval of
our investigation. Out of these 63 power users, we iden-
tified three users who activated assignments which have
been marked critical or very critical during our KPI anal-
ysis. A human IAM engineer could use this information
for defining a new re-certification policy that demands
a periodic assessment of all power users’ access privi-
leges. In contrast to standard SAP users whose access
privileged are re-certified once a year, power users might
be re-certified more frequently in order to reflect their
criticality value.
In summary, the evaluation based on data from an SAP
ERP system presented in this section of the paper under-
lined the applicability of the DPMP for structured policy
management in practice. Based on the prototypical exten-
sion of an existing IAM tool, we were able to import
previously unused contextual data, identify clusters of
standard as well as outlier usage behavior and visual-
ize the gathered results. Within the company, the results
increased management attention by providing in-depth
insight into the current access control state and its guid-
ing policies. At our partner’s side, efforts for evaluating
the application of the DPMP in a periodic manner (daily
operation), the extended analysis of further applications,
and the adaption of existing IAM policies are currently
made.
6 Conclusions
Over the last decades, company-wide IAM systems have
become a key element for controlling users’ access to
resources inmedium to large-sized enterprises. They offer
means for a centralized enforcement of standardized user
management processes and policies. Despite their impor-
tance, the management of IAM policies commonly still
needs to be executed manually. While current research
concentrates on mechanisms for policy detection and
enforcement, the complexity of user management in large
environments rather requires a structured and applicable
process for policy management. Human IAM engineers
need to be supported with guidance and automation dur-
ing the detection, implementation and refinement of IAM
policies.
In order to improve the current situation, we presented
the dynamic policy management process which structures
the activities during policy management into four phases.
It facilitates a mining engine which generates policy rec-
ommendations based on contextual data of employees and
further presents gathered results to human IAM engi-
neers. In order to underline the practical relevance and
applicability of our contribution, we conducted a practical
case study within a large industrial company and its ERP
system managing several thousands of users and more
than one million access privileges.
We showed and also experienced from our industrial
projects that policy management is an important task
withinmodern IAM architectures as it provides an anchor
for the system to work properly and secure in a time
where enterprises begin to realize that the traditional cas-
tle approach of their IT imposes several risks e.g. due to
cloud computing, work anywhere, IoT or Industry 4.0.
Due to these developments, IAM will become even more
important and therefore need a stable basis to work on.
For future work, we plan to extend the DPMP in order
to improve the representation and management of pol-
icy recommendations. Practical experience shows that
a high amount of potentially conflicting recommenda-
tions increases manual efforts of human role engineers
and requires an in-depth understanding of the underlying
data. In the future, we hence aim at providing an analy-
sis of policy interdependencies in order to overcome this
limitation.We additionally aim at extending our prototype
implementation and evaluate the DPMP throughout fur-
ther practical use cases considering contextual data from
decentralized applications.
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